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STRADDLING REALITIES: THE URBAN FOUNDATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA
Peter Wilkinson
Until perhaps as recently as a year ago, it would have
been tempting to construct a 'radical1 critique of the
Urban Foundation (UF) around the apparent compatibility of
the organization's programme with the objectives of the
'Total Strategy' formulated by the government of P.W. Botha.
Indeed, elements of such an analysis remain central to the
argument that will be advanced here. But since the events
of the past year have exposed the deep-seated antipathy of
an important section of the government's electoral base
towards any attempt at 'meaningful reform', the inadequacy
of a critique which simply continues to assert the UF's
complicity in 'Total Strategy' must be confronted.
After the recent much-heralded 'report back1 conference
between Botha and leading businessmen fizzled out inconclu-
sively in Cape Town, it would be merely naive to attempt
to maintain the notion of an unpvoblematic partnership of
'state' and 'capital' in a joint project aimed at co-opting
the black 'middle classes' under the guise of implementing
an essentially hollow reform strategy. What I shall be
trying to do in this article, therefore, is to shift the
analysis of the UFVs role in contemporary South Africa
beyond the terms of this now somewhat unproductive polemic.
I propose to approach the problem in two stages. In the
first place, I want to locate the UF within the framework
of the present (November 1981) conjuncture in South Africa
by tracing, briefly and somewhat schematically, certain
developments bearing on the role of the Foundation during
the nearly five years that have elapsed since it was ini-
tially set up in December 1976. Secondly, I shall argue that
these developments have left the UF in a position in which
it is poised between the reality in which it first took
shape and the reality of the present, and I shall explore
some of the dimensions of the critical strategic choice
with which I believe it is now faced.
Throughout, in order to keep the length of this article
within acceptable limits and to avoid unnecessary references
to matters that have received extensive coverage in the
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press, I will assume a degree of broad familiarity on the
part of readers with the more general aims and activities
of the UF.1
****************
To even the most casual observer, it must be clear that
the South African 'situation1 has changed dramatically since
1976. In order to pick out those developments which I
consider to have had particular significance in relation
to the role of the UF, I shall delineate a necessarily
rather arbitrary-seeming division of this period into three
phases. It is, of course, obvious that such periodizations
- particularly of such recent history - must be directly
derived from certain analytical premises. Although these
will not be explicitly discussed here, I hope that they
will become evident in the course of the analysis itself.
PHASE 1: JUNE 1976 - SEPTEMBER 1978
During the earlier part of this phase, much of the state's
energy and attention was committed to re-establishing
control in the townships, often with extensive and unres-
trained use of force. It is understandable, then that the
iniative towards the social reforms that were obviously
necessary if some degree of legitimacy for the South
African system was to be maintained in the black communities,
fell, in the first instance, to certain of the more pro-
gressively inclined representatives of commerce and industry.
Specifically, we see that as early as August 1976, Harry
Oppenheimer and Anton Rupert met in London to discuss the
idea of a "businessmen's conference on the quality of life
in urban communities".
The immediate result of the conference - which was held
three months later in November - was a decision by the
businessmen present to form a Foundation, financed and
managed by the 'private sector1, to "promote improvement
of the qualify of life" in the black townships "on a non-
racial, non-political basis".2 The Foundation was formally
established as an "Incorporated Association not for Gain"
in February 1977, and within three months had begun "a
relentless and unremitting pursuit" of its primary objective
of obtaining a secure form of tenure for Africans in urban
areas - which was eventually to bear fruit in the passage
of the 99-year leasehold legislation as an amendment to the
Bantu (Urban Areas) Act in June 1978. A year earlier, in
June 1977 the UF had initiated "intensive negotiations"
with "organised commerce and industry" to secure agreement
on a code of employment practice - the joint UF - SACCOLA
code published in December 1977 - which predated by some
two months the state•s appointment of the Wiehahn and
Riekert Commissions to enquire into "labour legislation
and other related matters" and "legislation affecting the
utilization of manpower", respectively.3
Yet, within the state apparatus during this early period,
repression of the revolt in the townships was not the sole
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matter of concern. In March 1977, P.W. Botha (then Minister
of Defence and possibly still smarting from the experience
of the aborted invasion of Angola) tabled a White paper
calling for a "total national strategy ... applicable at
all levels and to all functions of the state structure . . .
comprehensive plan to utilize all the means available to
a state according to an integrated pattern in order to
achieve the national aims within the framework of specific
policies".4 Initially, endorsement of this notion of
'Total Strategy' appears to have remained confined to a
certain faction within the government and to that branch
of the state apparatus most directly involved in its
formulation, i.e. the military.
Just eighteen months later, however, with the Vorster
regime collapsing massively and ignominiously in the face
of the 'Information Scandal', the proponents of 'Total
Strategy' were suddenly - if by an extremely narrow margin
- elevated to the commanding heights of state power by .
Botha's accession to the premiership. It is this event
which I take to have signalled the start of the second phase
PHASE 2: SEPTEMBER 1978 - JANUARY 1981
Within weeks of Botha's assumption of office, the most
immediate threat to his newly acquired power was summarily
removed with Connie Mulder's resignation from the Cabinet
as a result of further disclosures in the Information
Scandal. Botha and his allies - including Mulder's
replacement as Minister of Plural Relations/Bantu Affairs,
Piet Koornhof - moved rapidly to consolidate their position
at the head of what was shortly being hailed as a truly
verligte Nationalism. In a display of mutual goodwill
unknown since the Nationalists had taken up the reins of
government in 1948, overtures were made by the government
to the business community to draw it into the implementa-
tion of 'Total Strategy1 - always an integral part of the
overall concept5-and appeared to be meeting with
considerable success.
The growing rapprochement between business interests
and the government attained its high point at the Prime
Minister's Carlton conference of November 1979. It is
possible that the conference was intended to smooth the
way for an at least tacit 'division of labour' in the task
of maintaining political, social and economic stability
in South Africa which would be accepted by both sides.6
Broadly speaking, this would have involved the government
in a restructuring of its political policies to facilitate
a more 'rational' economic exploitation of the sub-con-
tinent's human and natural resources, while the private
sector would have been responsible for tackling problems
supposedly susceptible to amelioration by the expansion
of the 'free enterprise' system, such as rural under-
development, unemployment, an inadequately skilled labour
force and the relative absence of a black entrepreneurial
class.
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In this atmosphere, it would not have been unreasonable
to anticipate that the role already taken on by the UF in
dealing with the unfortunate effects of 'old-style'
apartheid on the 'quality of life1 in the townships could
take on a new and expanded effectivity. Certainly, the
notion of 'quality of life1 encompassed many of the pro-
blems which had been identified as open to private sector
involvement. In terms of its charter, moreover, the UF
had been committed to intervention in a "complementary role
to the public sector", which meant that there would "at all
times be full consultation with central, provincial, and
local Government in the planning and execution of projects."7
It may well have seemed that the Botha government was
attempting to implement sufficient real, if still partial
reforms of its inherited apartheid policy to give the
Foundation's efforts to contribute to "the creation of a
long term, socio-political climate in which free enterprise
itself will survive"8 a good chance of succeeding.
In terms of what were apparently considered to be the
essential preconditions for such survival - articulated
by Anton Rupert as "a free market economy, a stable black
middle class with the necessary security of tenure, per-
sonal security and a feeling of hope for a betterment (sic)
in the hearts of all our people"9- the programme of
action that had been adopted by the UF made sense. The
99-year leasehold scheme it had so assiduouslv championed
would provide the "necessary security of tenure" for the
development of a "stable black middle class", at least
until full freehold tenure could be won for it. And, for
those unable to aspire to the leashold legislation's
'rights of occupancy1 in such developing e"lite suburbs
as Selection Park and Beverley Hills (in Soweto), pilot
'self help1 low-cost housing projects at Khutsong {near
Carletonville) and Inanda (near Durban) would provide at
least the possibility of "hope for a betterment" in the
material conditions of their daily existence. In the mean-
time, the further possibilities of a "free", or at least
"freer market economy" and of "personal security" for at
least some of the African inhabitants of the urban areas
were under review by the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions.
Gradually, however, throughout 1980, the euphoria
generated in some circles by the Carlton conference began
to wane as it became increasingly clear that the
'reformist' faction within the National Party was not as
tightly in control of either the party or the government
as had been believed. Iniatives introduced by one state
department were sometimes fiercely resisted by another -
as, for instance, in the refusal of the Department of
Community Development to consider the merits of 'self
help' site and service schemes proposed by the Department
of Co-operation and Development. Ministers found that
their ability to direct the implementation of Cabinet
policy within their own departments was more constrained
than they had imagined - leading in Koornhof's case to
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the discovery of a much-parodied 'tortoise1 syndrome
within the civil service. And incursions by the far right
into the NP's traditional electoral base in a series of
by-elections held during the year exacerbated growing
tensions within the party. Finally, late in January 1981,
in an attempt to re-unite a political constituency rapidly
fracturing, under the pressures of both external events
(escalation of the 'border' war, the consolidation of a
nominally socialist government in Zimbabwe) and internal
economic problems (the increasingly difficult situation
of the white working class), along a bewildering variety
of stress lines not previously visible, Botha dissolved
Parliament and called a general election for April.
Before we proceed to examine the third and last phase
I have identified here, I want briefly to point to two
further tendencies which characterized the latter part of
the second phase and which have continued into the third
and possibly up to the present. The first of these was
the dawning realisation by the leaders of the private
sector's reform initiative that the Botha government might
yet prove to be either unable or unwilling to actually
deliver its expected package of policy reforms. This was
signalled as early as June 1979 by the failure of the
Riekert Commission's report (and even more so the subsequent
White Paper) to confront what the Financial Mail identi-
fied as "the central weakness of the labour bureaux - their
part in enforcing the pass laws."10 The growing disen-
chantment of progressive business leaders with the Botha
regime was further reflected in the declining prominence
accorded by the opposition press to the notion of 'Total
Strategy1 as 1980 wore on. In effect, it appears that the
'report-back1 conference held in Cape Town in November 1981
has probably delivered the coup de gr&ce to whatever
credibility the concept might still have retained.
The second tendency during this period to which I wish
to draw attention was the emergence and gradual, but still
fragile consolidation of a number of increasingly effec-
tive community based movements committed to the ideal of
establishing participatory democracy at the grass roots
level of local government. in the major metropolitan
centres, organizations able to mobilize substantial popular
support in the black townships around specific issues like
inadequate housing and facilities, or rent increases, arose
to challange the idea that the question of the 'quality of
life1 in the townships could genuinely be posed on a
"non-racial, non-political basis". In particular, at the
level of their political practices, such organizations
consistently refused to operate through the medium of the
blatantly unrepresentative institutions set up by the
state in its efforts to secure the co-operation of
'community leaders'. Further, at the level of their
political practices, such organizations consistently
refused to operate through the medium of the blatantly
unrepresentative institutions set up by the state in its
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efforts to secure the co-operation of 'community leaders'.
Further, at the level of their understanding of the funda-
mental nature of the 'quality of life1 problem, these
organizations began to question the validity of any
'solution' which in their perception remained merely
ameliorative, dealing with the symptoms rather than the
underlying structural causes of the problem.11
I will argue that the appearance of this social force in
the townships now presents to the UF both a more complex
arena in which to operate, and the possibility of making
its intervention more effective in terms of its own crite-
rion of "an over-riding emphasis on projects based on
self-help and self-determination."12 If, in the assertion
of the Foundation's executive director that "community
involvement in every aspect of the Foundation is critical
to its success", 13 'community involvement1 is meant in any
but the most cynical of terms, it seems unlikely that a
choice between ignoring such movements and working with
them as independent and authentically representative organs
of popular 'self-determination' can be avoided. In order
to explore this hypothesis more fully, however, I wish to
bring the analysis forward to the present by considering the
last phase in the periodization I have proposed.
PHASE 3: JANUARY 1981 - PRESENT
The run up to the election in April was marked by the
reversion of most of the so-called 'reformists' in the
National Party to the unbridled swart gevaar tactics so
successfully employed by the party during the 1950s and
1960s. Even such masters of the ambiguous statement of
'reformist' intention as Piet Koornhof adopted the tradi-
tional postures as panic over the extent of defections
of the faithful to the far right mounted. In the event,
the results of the election provided unequivocal evidence
of a substantial, if still relatively contained disaffec-
tion within the white working class and elements of the
middle classes with the direction taken by the party under
Botha ' s leadership.1 *•
The effect of the election results has been to deepen
a trend which had already become apparent as 'Total
Strategy1 began to dissolve under the pressure of events
during 1980: a propensity by the government to sequester
the more controversial issues confronting it within the
terms of reference of a Commission of Enquiry whose findings,
when they were eventually released, could be either simply
ignored or referred to yet another Commission or Committee
for further consideration. In the face of this now
seemingly chronic inability of the government to move
positively on the issue of 'meaningful reform1, the
alienation of that section of the business community
committed to such reform has continued.
Clear signs of impatience with the government's failure
to advance beyond this impasse and an awareness of its
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consequences in relation to the credibility of private
sector initiatives have been expressed in some of the more
recent documents published by the UF. In the Foundation's
Annual Review for 1980/81, for instance, produced in
February 1981, the executive director wrote:
Our future relationships with this important
constituency (i.e. "Black communities") are
unfortunately not dependent only upon our own
efforts. Our third constituency (i.e. the
"Public sector") controls much of the access that
we have to opportunities that demonstrate the
private sector's willingness to contribute to
structural change in South Africa.15
But, in addition to these problems, the UF has evidently
also begun to encounter difficulties with the remaining member
of its supposed "three constituencies".16 Again in the
Annual Review for 1980/81, Judge Steyn - after noting that
the initial impetus of fund-raising by the Foundation had
not been maintained during the previous year - stated that
it was his belief that "save for a small group of leaders
of commerce and industry, much of the business community
is unaware of or indifferent to the real significance which
urgent Black aspirations have assumed in Africa."17
One might speculate that the origins of the resistance
experienced by the UF in this quarter in its efforts to
contribute to "structural change in South Africa" is not
unconnected with the emergence of the so-called 'New Right1
in Britain and the United States. If as a businessman, you
believe merely that "the business of business is business"
or, more philosophically, subscribe to the doctrine that
Adam Smith's invisible hand' really does promote the
'public interest1 most effectively, 18 then you can have
little in the way of common cause with an organization which
"pre-eminently ...reflects the concern and sensitivity of
the business community in respect of unacceptable aspects
of our society and its structures."19 (Other than on the .
purely charitable basis which the UF emphatically rejects.20)
In any event, when this possibility is coupled with an
explicit recognition by the UF of the deep divisions
existing within black communities - which, however, is
followed immediately by what seems to be an indication of
the Foundation's intention to plump for "the support of
much of the acknowledged Black leadership"21 - it is
evident that it is no longer actually attempting to mediate
between "three constituencies". The Foundation is, in
fact, now enmeshed in the extraordinarily complex set of
deep-rooted antagonisms and conflicts which traverse the
entire social fabric of South Africa. Even if at one time
the notion of the 'public sector1, the 'private sector'
and the 'Black communities' as relatively unified or
homogeneous entities (or 'constituencies') approximated to
reality, it clearly no longer does so.
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Furthermore I want to put forward the proposition that
the UF itself is not a privileged institution and that,
like the state or any other element of the social structure
in a society like South Africa, it remains subject to
internal clashes of the values and practices generated
within it by the 'external' structure. In particular,
there exists in the Foundation's programme of action and
its mode of operation a real tension between the idea of
'free enterprise' and the notion of 'social responsibility
which in turn is cross-cut by the tension between an
emphasis on community 'self-determination' - surely only
realisable in a fully democratic society - and a pragmatic
commitment to working through the existing channels of
power. It is these tensions, I believe, which developments
over the last five years have brought to the surface and
which the Foundation must now confront.
The most significant of the factors defining the situation
within which the UF must attempt to resolve these conflicts
is, I would argue, the entry into the social and political
arena of the new, democratically organized community
movements. In a very immediate and concrete way, these
organizations have defined a field of action which to an
important degree overlaps, even if it does not exhaust
the areas of intervention mapped out by the Foundation. At
the same time, the objectives and methods developed by the
Foundation under what I have suggested were the quite
different circumstances of an earlier period have apparently
begun to encounter the increasingly difficult and fragmented
conditions that now prevail. The notion of "three
constituencies" can no longer be sustained when the divi-
sions within those 'constituencies' have deepened and
widened to the extent that they quite obviously have over
the last two years.
So, with its conventional wisdom rendered untenable by
the course of events, and with its accepted methods rapidly
disintegrating in the cauldron of the present, it seems that
the UF is now faced with a critical strategic choice.
Either - despite what are clearly major differences in both
long-term goals, and the more immediate questions of tactics
and 'style' - it can attempt to forge links with the
developing community movements which remain unequivocally
committed to those structural changes without which the
'quality of life' in the townships of South Africa cannot,
in any fundamental way, be improved. Or it can continue
to cling to the approach that has served it (with a certain,
limited efficacy) in the past and face the prospect of
being overtaken by history. Whichever choice it makes,
South Africa, driven by profound contradictions and strug-
gles which we can still only dimly comprehend, lurches on
into the future. Straddling the reality of its past and
the reality of its present, the Urban Foundation stands
poised at the moment of its crisis. We await, with
interest, an indication of the direction it will take.
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